Introduction
Intra-state conflicts have been endemic in Pakistan since its independence in 1947. The most disastrous for the country was the civil war in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The concentration of political power and government-initiated programs and investments in the western part of the country and the increasing regional disparities led to the alienation and resentment of the people in the eastern part. The triggers for the intra-state conflict were the unwillingness of the military regime to hand over power to the democratically elected leader from East Pakistan and long periods of military rule that deprived the country of democratic mechanisms to reconcile political and economic differences. Another long-simmering intra-state conflict in Pakistan is Balochistan -the largest province of the federation in area and the smallest in population. The demand of the local Baloch population for regional autonomy, their resentment at the slow pace of provincial economic development, the influx of people from other provinces, and the exploitation of the extensive natural resources of the province without equitable distribution of benefits have led to political and social tensions and the insurgency. Four waves of violent unrest took place in 1948 in , 1958 in -59, 1962 in -63 and 1973 in -77. In early 2005 tensions in Balochistan again increased, with numerous clashes reported between security forces and the Baloch tribesmen.
The Pakistani experience suggests that there were two main determinants of the intra-state conflicts: (1) development strategies and approaches that led to uneven development and institutionalized exclusion of various groups and regions from benefits accruing from government-initiated programs, and (2) military dominated governments in about half of Pakistan's 62 years history that deprived citizens of political mechanisms to express their grievances and resolve differences. Other causes include the feudal structures characterized by unequal patterns of land ownership, the manipulation of ideological and ethnic differences by politicians both at the national and regional levels for short-term political gains, and the failure of political leadership to provide the societal vision and mobilize citizens for the public good.
This chapter examines the impact of development strategies (independent variable) and democratic governance (intervening variable) on intra-state conflicts in Pakistan. After describing the main elements of development strategies and their impacts during various phases, the chapter discusses the evolution of the Baloch insurgency, the demand of regional autonomy and the extent of economic and social disparities between Balochistan and other regions of the federation. Also examined are the government responses and insurgency management strategies and the recently introduced Balochistan Empowerment Package launched by the newly elected democratic government.
Pakistan's Development Strategies and Their Impact
Since independence, Pakistan's development strategies have undergone through five phases: (1) centralized economic growth up to 1965, (2) increased state intervention in the national economy with populist approach in the 1970s, (3) rapid economic growth with greater intervention by the military in the 1980s, (4) the phase led by democratic governments from 1988 to 1999 and later the military-led Musharraf Government that focused on policy package which is generally associated with the -Washington Consensus,‖ and, (5) development strategies followed by the newly elected democratic government in the context of political instability after the demise of the Musharraf regime and an alarming rise in terrorism and political violence (Hamid 2008: 47-52 During the 1950s and 1960s, the strategy was focused on the promotion of industrialization through import substitution policies and central planning with leading role of government in the economy. The government established public enterprises in the manufacturing sector and subsequently sold many of these to the private sector. A system of multiple exchange rates was set up to encourage exports. Centralized planning was introduced with heavy investment in the western part of the country where the newly independent state had a relatively better developed infrastructure, seat of the federal government and economic growth poles ( Hamid 2008, 47-52 ).
The development strategies followed in the 1950s and 1960s accelerated economic growth leading to the world-wide recognition of Pakistan as one of the development -success‖ stories. The economic growth, however, was not equitably distributed among different constituent units of the federation. There were pronounced differences in income levels, investments in infrastructure, economic opportunities and access to basic social services between the western part of the country (West Pakistan) and the eastern part (now Bangladesh). This led to political alienation and resentment on the part of the population in the eastern part. The military-dominated governments in the 1960s that deprived the citizens of the opportunities for political participation further increased alienation among the population of the poorer regions, especially in East Pakistan and the area which is now called Balochistan. Political unrest in the late 1960s forced the military government to hold free elections, which resulted in the victories of the Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples Party in the eastern and western parts of the country, respectively. Unwillingness of the military to cede power to the Awami League, which had a majority in the Parliament, led to the civil war, intervention by India, and subsequently the independence of Bangladesh.
One of the lessons learned from the international experience in promoting progrowth strategies in the 1950s and 1960s is that during the early years after independence such strategies worked more effectively in homogenous societies such as the Republic of Korea than in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual societies such as Pakistan. While there is no doubt about the efficiency of pro-growth strategies, heterogeneous societies are in greater need of democratic mechanisms for political bargaining during the initial years of political integration than homogeneous societies. The absence of balance between political development and economic development proved to be counter productive to national integration in Pakistan.
The second phase of development strategies was initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the popularly elected leader after a decade of military-led governments.
Major investments were made in mega-projects including steel mills, the Tarbella Dam, and the nuclear program. The private-sector-led growth strategy was reversed. The new strategy focused on heavy-industry-based industrialization led by the state. The Bhutto government nationalized the engineering, cement, and chemical industries, as well as the oil refineries. Other industries that were nationalized included shipping, banking, life insurance, and power utilities. The government monopolized the export trade in rice and cotton, and initiated the public sector investment program in heavy industry (Hamid 2008: 47-52) .
The above and related policies pursued by Bhutto led to the end of the first growth cycle of Pakistan, with an increase in fiscal and current account deficits. High level of government intervention in the economy including nationalization of selected industries led to the decrease in private investment. The decline in growth could also be attributed to the first oil crisis, the large-scale public investment program, and a large increase in the development expenditures including the expansion of investments in basic social services and heavy investment in large projects of national importance. The military expenditure was another drain on national resources. The dismissal of elected government of Balochistan increased political alienation and conflicts in the region, to be discussed in later section of the chapter.
The military-led government of Zia-ul-Haq, which came into power in 1977, reversed some of the populist policies pursued by the Zulfikar Bhutto government. Ziaul-Haq denationalized some of the industries and liberalized trade. But he continued the public sector investment program, the state ownership of the banking sector, and restrictions on imports and zoning regulations for sugar mills.
The Zia-ul-Haq period was characterized by rapid economic growth due to a set of factors -large capital inflows from the United States, other Western countries, and international financial institutions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a sharp increase in workers remittances from the oil rich Middle Eastern countries, and many years of bumper crops leading to increase in exports, especially of cotton and textiles.
This phase of Pakistan's development, however, had many negative effects as well. It led to an inefficient and unbalanced industrial sector, consisting of state-owned industries producing steel, fertilizer, and cement. It contributed to a growing fiscal and current account deficit which was financed through domestic borrowing and inflow of foreign assistance. Heavy sanctions imposed on Pakistan by the United States in response to the continuation of the Pakistani nuclear program after the end of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan led to the balance-of-payment crisis. This led to the end of the second cycle of economic growth (Hamid 2008: 47-52) . During this period, the Baloch insurgency continued to simmer. However, the intensity of conflict was curtailed by Zia ul Haq because his alliance with the Islamic political parties in Balochistan that had formed the provincial coalition government.
The fourth phase began in 1988. Democratic governments from 1988 to 1999 and later the military-led Musharraf Government introduced various policy reforms. These governments implemented privatization, investment deregulation, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, and tax reforms. However, they failed to maintain adequate fiscal discipline and were at various points forced to implement stabilization programs.
During the Musharraf regime, growth levels were higher than during the earlier democratic governments led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. However, growth began to slow down after Musharraf's ouster from power. Pressures on the balance of payments, high inflation, and severe shortages of energy at an alarming scale demonstrated that the short-term growth during his regime was not sustainable. This could also be attributed to the period of political instability after the declaration of emergency by Musharraf, political unrest in the country, and mounting the Taliban 7 insurgency. As discussed in the later section of the chapter, the use of force to establish the authority of the government in Baloch dominant areas of the province led to increased conflict between the Baloch nationalists and the central government. (Cheema, 2010, pp. 12) Given the magnitude of this worst disaster in the world during the past 50 years, the state is going to face tremendous challenges in designing and implementing development strategies. Due to this lack of consensus between the federal and provincial governments, interim awards and grants benefiting larger provinces have been the norm. Another consequence of the present criterion is that the central government has been "overstretching" itself by expanding its activities to include road construction and rural development, which are the provincial subjects. In some of the recent awards by the NFC, provinces have been given more resources and development funds, which has encouraged fiscal decentralization.
Despite being federally constituted, the NFC has not succeeded in providing rational and equity-oriented criteria for resource distribution. Hussain (2008, pp. 1-2) , these include the following:  An elite-based power structure, denying the majority of citizens adequate access to high quality education, health facilities, land, the judicial system, and high wage end of the labor market;  Institutional constraints on the access to resources and decision making;  Patron-client relationships with the democratically elected governments for rentseeking, which reduces incentives for enterprise, innovation, and savings;  Constraints on poor farmers, including higher prices on their inputs, lower prices on their outputs, and highly unequal land ownership. In Sindh, the native Sindhis opposed Punjabi settlers in rural areas and perceived threat to the Sindhi language from Mohajirs (refugees from India after Partition). They also pointed out inadequate access to services and income disparities vis-à-vis Punjabis and Muhajirs.
In Balochistan, the annexation of Balochistan States in 1948, the demand for political autonomy, and the dismissal of elected governments in1973 and 1988 created alienation among the Baloch population, The case of the Baloch insurgency below shows the complexity of designing and implementing development strategies in the context of the regional disparities of income and access to services and the identification of the population with ethnicity. Impacts of some of these strategies on the resentment of the Baloch population are also examined.
Evolution of Baloch Insurgency
Nationalism and quest for identity have been the predominant features of Baloch politics over the past 100 years (Breseeg 2004; Barohi 2009; Naseer 2009) As the table below shows, the Baloch insurgency has been simmering for the past 62 years, with periods of upsurge in violence and use of military force to suppress violence. While the level of conflict has varied from one period to another over the past 62 years, the political autonomy for Balochistan has been the core demand of the Baloch nationalists since the establishment of Pakistan.
Demand for Provincial Autonomy
The 1973 
Economic and Social Disparities
Balochistan is a resource rich region, with extremely low density and multi-ethnic There Only two in five children in the 5-9 age group were enrolled in primary school. Even though more resources through the national projects were channeled through the province, it did not lead to the reduction of trust deficit between the Baloch nationalists and the federal government because of a lack of consultation between the local population and the government in the process of designing and implementing the projects.
Balochistan has a labor scarce economy with little crop production, no industry except for near Karachi, and services that largely cater to local demands. However, other provinces of Pakistan have a labor abundant economy, with growth poles in intensive agriculture, manufacturing, banking, energy and telecommunication. The remoteness and geographical diversity of Balochistan provides a development context which is different from other provinces.
Effective delivery of and access to services are essential to improve living standards of the population and expand economic opportunities. Yet, the geographical diversity and remoteness of Balochistan makes it more expensive vis-à-vis the densely populated areas. The World Bank Report suggested the following to cope with this situation (World Bank 2008). The public administration systems and processes at the district and local levels must be reformed-they are extremely weak and thus have not been able to ensure that basic education and health services reach the poor. In the educational sector, the government needs to build more public schools and improve school infrastructure and teacher qualifications. In the health sector, the need is to address the low utilization of public health services, lack of resources, inadequate coverage of essential services in remote areas, the lack of skilled women. More than 46 percent of the households do not have electricity.
The feudal structure of Balochistan including the dominance of "Sardars" poses a serious challenge to socio-economic changes in the province. One point of view is that the Sardars are not interested in the modernization and development of the masses, but want to exploit the tribal loyalties for their personal benefits. The other point is that the Sardars want both economic and social development of their respective areas as well as to maintain the Baloch identify and tribal affiliation. In either case, one of the constraints facing the Sardars is their own internal disintegration and rivalries that often enable the Federal Government to divide them.
Government Response and Insurgency Management
To varying degrees, successive government in Pakistan have used combinations of responses to cope with the rising Baloch insurgency -cooption of tribes to gain their loyalties, use of force especially when the government's legitimacy is challenged, sharing of revenues with the provincial government emanating from the exploitation of gas and other natural resources, and launch of the centrally planned socio-economic development projects including mega-projects such as the port of Gwadar.
After independence the federal government's strategy to control and enhance central power was to co-opt local Sardars and use force to subdue others who defied the central control. In some ways, the same process was followed in many post-independence developing countries as they tried to forge national integration out of ethnic, linguistic and regional diversities. Over the years, the geostrategic importance of Balochistan has increased because of its location to the proximity to Afghanistan and land and air routes vital for trade and energy development (Wirsing 2008; Ahmad 1992) . With the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan, the feasibility of various proposals for energy pipelines were studied, including one from Iran to India through Pakistan.
Balochistan has also assumed greater military strategic importance. Gwadar Sea Port was considered by the security establishment in Pakistan as the best alternative naval base in case of a conflict with India. It was also considered of strategic importance to China because over 60 percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the nearby port of Hormuz. Chinese investments in Gwadar will give strategic depth to China which is considered as a concern by India and to some extent by the US. However, heavy Over the years, the trust deficit between the Baloch nationalists and the Federal Government has increased due to excessive use of force leading to political prisoners and -missing persons", population displacement due to conflict and some of the megaprojects, and dispute over royalties and the provision of gas and oil exploited from the province. The construction of more military cantonments, differences over mega-projects such as Gwadar port construction, and poor structure and performance of security forces has worsened the conflict. Also the central government has continued to establish a highly centralized system of government which is in conflict with the aspirations of less populous federal units such as Balochistan.
Experience in Balochistan suggests that greater investments in Balochistan and the utilization of its resources are essential but not sufficient to promote peace, stability and economic development in the province. The most critical factor is the engagement of the nationalist political parties and groups in decision-making affecting Balochistan. In this regard, the recently launched Balochistan Empowerment Package by the democratically elected government is the most comprehensive multi-faceted set of actions to transform relationships between the Baloch leadership and the federal government.
Baluchistan Empowerment Package
The elected government that took over after the 2008 Economic Issues -The most significant components of the Balochistan Empowerment Package relate to the economic matters and include (1) a uniform price of gas throughout
Pakistan for calculating the gas development surcharge; (2) the allocation for poverty to be in proportion to the percentage of people living below poverty line in each province;
(3) greater shares of revenues and profits from gas exploration and production to be given to the Provincial Government and the concerned District Government; (4) supply of gas on priority basis to the residents of the district where gas fields are located.
There are specific recommendations about employment opportunities for Balochistan, including the creation of 5000 additional jobs for the province and the prescription of Balochistan quota in the rules for employment in Government and its agencies. The use of multiple criteria for the allocation of resources from the divisible pool has taken place for the first time in Pakistan's history. The willingness of Punjab, the largest and the most prosperous province of the federation, to share funds from the federal tax pool on multiple criteria will inevitably have positive impact on less populous provinces, especially Balochistan which is the most backward and most sparsely populated. The three other provincial governments agreed to cut their shares in order to increase the share of Balochistan. Under the award, the share of Balochistan will increase from the existing 7.17 percent to 9.09 percent. The province will receive arrears of the gas development surcharge due since 2002. The NFC decided that the well-head price of gas would be equal in all provinces, which has been one of the demands of the Baloch nationalists.
The federal government also increased the share of provinces under the vertical distribution of funds from the divisible pool to 46 percent in the first year of award (2010 -2011) and to 57.7 percent during the next four year of the award period. This was a significant increase because the share of provinces in the pool under the sixth NFC award was 47.5 percent. The federal government also agreed under the 7 th Award to reduce charges for the collection of taxes from 5 to 1 percent, which will increase the transfers from the divisible pool to the federating units. 
